We consider strategic trade and privatization policies in international bilateral mixed markets where a domestic state-owned enterprise competes with both domestic and foreign private enterprises in each country. We examine the strategic interaction of two countries' optimal choices of privatization and trade policies with different combinations of production subsidy and import tariff, and find some interesting policy implications. First, a higher social welfare can be achieved with the appropriate degree of privatization when both governments adopt a production subsidy only. Second, FTA can work as a coordination device to solve the prisoner's dilemma problem. Third, the maximum-revenue privatization, combined with zero subsidy and higher tariff, is higher than optimum-welfare privatization. Finally, the international bilateral equilibrium needs less degree of privatization and lower subsidy rate, even though it is jointly suboptimal from the viewpoint of global welfare.
Introduction
Since the 1980s, many developed and developing countries have continued to privatize their state-owned enterprises (SOEs) under the global trends of trade liberalization.
1 Yet, SOEs are strongly concentrated in a few strategic sectors and thus, they still control large portions of the world's resources. 2 Over half (in values terms) of all SOEs in OECD countries are significant players in sectors such as transportation, telecommunications, power generation, electricity, finance, manufacturing, and other energy industries. Along with the open economy and trade liberalization, such as negotiations for joining the WTO or establishing free trade areas, FTA has also inspired foreign firms' entry into those industries, even with the existence of SOEs.
Although existing literature suggests that there are some gains in the efficiency of a privatized firm, researchers in the fields of industrial organization, international trade and development economics, and especially those who are interested in the privatization of the SOE, want to further explore how the foreign competition affects the desirability of privatization in mixed markets where the SOE competes with domestic and foreign private firms. In particular, economic studies on how to substantially reset production subsidy and import tariff are still increasingly important.
The economic modelling of a mixed oligopoly with domestic and foreign competitors begins with Fjell and Pal (1996) , who investigated the effect of introducing foreign private firms on the equilibrium price and allocation of production. White (1996) introduced the production subsidy into the mixed market and found that welfare is unchanged by privatization if subsidies are used before and after privatization. This privatization neutrality theorem was supported by Tomaru (2006) and Kato and Tomaru (2007) , who showed that the optimal subsidy, all firms' output, profits and social welfare are identical regardless of the share in a SOE and the objectives of the firms. However, Matsumura and Tomaru (2012) showed that privatization matters on the welfare even under the optimal tax-subsidy policy if there are foreign competitors.
Other theoretical literature has analyzed import tariff in an international mixed market. Chang (2005) examined a mixed duopoly model with a more efficient foreign firm under Cournot and Stackelberg competition, and showed that the optimal level of privatization depends crucially upon the strategic substitutability-complementarity assumption. Chao and Yu (2006) found that foreign competition lowers the optimal tariff rate but partial privatization raises it. Wang et al. (2012) examined the effect of privatization on the priority of the maximum revenue tariff and the optimumwelfare tariff under Cournot and Stackelberg competitions, and showed that the optimum-welfare tariff will be lower than the maximum-revenue tariff regardless of the order of firms' move when the asymmetric marginal cost of the privatized firm is higher than a critical value.
Some studies simultaneously consider the relations between privatization policy and dual trade instruments, production subsidy or/and import tariff, in a mixed market. Pal and White (1998) examined the interaction between privatization and strategic trade policies, and found that the welfare is always increased with privatization if production subsidy is used only. However, privatization increases welfare over much of the parameter space if import tariff is used only. Pal and White (2003) also showed that the existence of SOE lowers optimal tariffs and subsidies, but also lowers the total volume of trade between the two countries. The lower volume of trade, however, does not translate into lower levels of welfare for the trading countries. Chang (2007) , Lee (2011), and Han (2012) examined the optimal privatization and trade policies in an international mixed market and showed that full nationalization is the best choice under Cournot competition, but the privatization strategy is affected strongly by trade instruments and cost difference between firms. Wang et al. (2014) examined privatization policy and entry regulation in a mixed oligopoly market with foreign competitors and free entry. It demonstrated that as long as the entry cost is relatively lower, domestic entry is socially excessive whether it is free trade or the domestic government imposes the tariff policy. Wang and Chiou (2015) showed that the welfare effect of privatization will be affected by the trade liberalization policy, and the optimum-welfare tariff and privatization should be higher in the presence of subsidy policy of foreign country than those in the absence of subsidy policy.
FTAs are in the process of being enacted. The well-known inter-regional economic cooperation agreements on FTAs include the European Economic Community (EEC), North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), Southern Common Market (MERCOSUR), and ASEAN Free Trade Area.
All those previous studies have still explored the relationship between privatization and trade policy in a unilateral mixed market framework, where the domestic SOE competes with domestic and foreign firms in the home country. However, as FTA has recently inspired foreign competition into domestic market, the strategic interaction between two governments becomes increasing and more important. The emergence of FTA requires the study on the further analysis of strategic trade policies in the context of international bilateral trade model.
In the strategic trade literature, Spencer (1984, 1985) firstly showed that government could improve its terms of trade through tariff or subsidy to take a leader position transferring a foreign firm's revenue to a domestic firm. Eaton and Grossman (1986) and Collie (1993) also analyzed the welfare effects of trade and industrial policies for a range of specifications of an oligopolistic industry and cost asymmetry. Van Long and Stähler (2009) examined that the home government can simultaneously subsidize domestic firms and impose tariffs. It is well-known proposition of trade theory that in the absence of directly trade-related distortions or policy goals, subsidies are superior to tariffs for achieving any economic objective in the pure oligopolistic market.
On the other hand, Barcena-Ruiz and Garzon (2005) firstly considered an international integrated mixed market, comprising of two countries. Assuming that SOEs are less efficient than private firms, they obtained that when the marginal cost of the SOE takes an intermediate value, each government wants the government of the other country to privatize its SOE. In this case, only one government privatizes and that government obtains lower social welfare. Dadpay and Heywood (2006) showed that two competing (domestic and foreign) SOEs play the role of trade barriers and the strategic interaction of the two governments usually serves to reduce welfare. Han and Ogawa (2008) , Lee et al. (2013) and Xu and Lee (2015) incorporated import tariff and examined the interaction of two countries regarding strategic choices of privatization policy and import tariff. They demonstrated that the equilibrium degree of privatization depends not only on the relative efficiency of the SOE, but also on choice of trade policy.
In this paper, we consider an international bilateral mixed market where a domestic state-owned enterprise competes with both domestic and foreign private enterprises in the context of intra-industry trade. We examine the strategic interaction of two countries' optimal choices on trade instruments and privatization policy. Specifically, we investigate two different options of production subsidy and import tariff, coupled with partial privatization, and demonstrate the following main results.
First, under Cournot competition, a higher social welfare can be achieved when both governments adopt a production subsidy instrument with partial privatization in international bilateral mixed markets. This is contrasted to the previous results under a unilateral mixed market, such as Lee (2011) and Han (2012) , in which the dual trade instruments of subsidy and tariff with full nationalization is the best choice. Second, when the SOE take a leader position under Stackelberg competition, except for the optimal degrees of privatization, the optimal levels of subsidy, tariff and social welfare are the same with those under Cournot competition. This is interesting in that as far as the optimal degree of privatization is well chosen, the social welfare is independent of the leadership power of the SOE in each country. Third, irrespective of whether symmetric or asymmetric choices of two countries on trade instruments between subsidy and tariff, we show that FTA can work as a coordination device to solve the prisoner's dilemma, where both countries could achieve higher social welfare if they cooperate and adopt a subsidy instrument only under FTA. Thus, it supports the result in Xu et al. (2016) , who showed that privatization policy can play the role of commitment device to encourage parties to agree to an FTA and thus, it can improve both domestic and global welfare. Fourth, we examine and compare the maximum-revenue equilibrium with the optimum-welfare equilibrium and show that the maximum-revenue privatization, combined with zero subsidy and higher tariff, is higher than optimum-welfare privatization in international bilateral mixed markets. Finally, the international bilateral equilibrium involves less degree of privatization level and lower subsidy rate, even though it is jointly suboptimal from the viewpoint of global welfare. This result is consistent with the result in Lee et al. (2013) , who neither consider the subsidy nor FTA agreements.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 introduces the basic model. In section 3, we investigate four different regime choices of production subsidy and import tariff with partial privatization under Cournot competition. In section 4, we examine the asymmetric choices of two countries on trade instruments between subsidy and tariff, compare the optimal equilibria with four scenarios in a unilateral mixed market, compare the results under Stackelberg competition, and investigate local optimum for maximum-revenue and global optimum for maximum-welfare. Section 5 concludes this paper.
The Model
Suppose that there are two countries: one is the home country (country 1) and the other is the foreign country (country 2). The home country and foreign country both have symmetric duopoly situations: each country has a state-owned enterprise (SOE) and a private enterprise (PE), which producing homogeneous products. We assume that the domestic SOE produce output for its domestic market only while the domestic PE can supply not only for domestic but also foreign markets. That is, we consider PEs can export the same products to the other country and two countries are engaged in intra-industry trade. We assume that the cost functions of SOE and PE are quadratic 5 and given as
Then, the profits of the SOE and PE in country i are
The consumer surplus is denoted as
. And the social welfare is defined as the sum of consumer surplus, domestic industry profits, import tariff revenues, i i e j T t q  and production subsidy, ( )
The firms' objective functions are subject to their ownership structures. We suppose that the PE, which has characteristics of private property rights, maximizes its profits, while the SOE, which can be partially (or fully) owned by the government. We assume that the manager of the SOE maximizes the share-weighted objectives between both social welfare and profits 6 , which are defined as
, where i  indicates the tendency of the SOE to seek profits in the process of privatization (or the shares owned by private investors).
In this paper, a two-stage game is constructed. In the first stage, both governments choose the levels of tariff, subsidy and privatization to maximize their domestic social welfares. In the second stage, the firms observe the levels of tariff, subsidy and privatization and then choose their output levels.
The Policy Analysis
We investigate and compare four regime choices of production subsidy and import tariff, coupled with partial privatization under Cournot competition: no trade instrument, production subsidy, import tariff and dual trade instruments.
Dual trade instruments
We consider the general case that both governments adopt dual trade instruments of production subsidy and import tariff with the privatization policy. In the second stage, the SOEs maximize their objective functions, O i , and the PEs maximize their own profits, pi  , after observing the levels of privatization. From the first-order conditions, we have the following equilibrium outputs of SOE and PE: 3(20 7 2 5 5 ) (18 83 20 37 11 ) 1 (27 8 7 8 ) 3(2 12 4 5 ) 
where i =1,2 and 3(45 19 19 8 )
The market output and price of country i are 
The social welfare of country i is
Let superscript "D*" denote the equilibrium outcome in dual trade instruments case. 
Substituting the optimal degree of privatization, subsidy, and tariff rates into the above equations, we obtain the outputs of SOEs and PEs, 
which implies that the government will strategically use the SOE to act as trade barriers and promote the domestic market competition for reaching a higher domestic social welfare. It is also noteworthy that the marginal production cost of SOE is higher than that of the PE, which is conferring cost disadvantages of export to the SOE at equilibrium. Then the market output and price 
No trade instrument
We consider the case where both governments do not use any trade instruments but only adopt the privatization policy to maximize their domestic social welfares. Let superscript "N*" denote the equilibrium outcome under no trade instrument regime. Setting 0 
Substituting the optimal degree of privatization into the above equations, we obtain the outputs of SOEs and PEs, 
Production subsidy
We consider the case that both governments adopt a production subsidy instrument with the privatization policy. Let superscript "S*" denote the equilibrium outcome under production subsidy regime. Setting 0 
Import tariff
We consider the case that both governments adopt an import tariff instrument with the privatization policy. Let superscript "T*" denote the equilibrium outcome under import tariff regime. 
Substituting the optimal degree of privatization and tariff rate into the above equations, we obtain the outputs of SOEs and PEs, 
Comparisons
We compare the results of four different regime choices of production subsidy and import tariff, coupled with partial privatization in the international bilateral mixed market. 
. This is because the output substitution effect between the SOE and PE is weakened while the welfare-reducing effect from the tariff is strengthened under the dual policy regime. Thus, the equilibrium results of subsidy regime cannot be sustained when both governments have an option to adopt the dual trade instruments when two countries can strategically change the rates of subsidy and tariff together under Cournot competition. 8 Accordingly, the government chooses lower degree of privatization and higher subsidy rates to protect domestic welfare. This is the sharp difference between the competitive equilibrium in the bilateral mixed market and the optimal equilibrium in the unilateral mixed market such as Han (2012) , which will be re-examined in the following section. (See Proposition 2) Second, this competitive equilibrium provides the prisoner's dilemma situation and thus, the FTA can work for solving this problem. That is, if two countries cooperate and adopt a subsidy instrument only under free trade agreement, then both of them could achieve higher social welfare levels. However, if two countries adopt the dual trade instruments of subsidy and tariff, then the social welfares are lower than those under a single trade instrument with subsidy. Even without subsidy policy under the framework of WTO, compared to the result in the import tariff only regime, the social welfares are higher when both governments choose no trade instrument regime, * * 0.327 0.324
That is, both governments can achieve higher welfare levels when they signed FTA which implies that FTA can work as a coordination device to solve the prisoner's dilemma in the bilateral mixed market. This result can be also applied to the asymmetric trade instruments case where domestic and foreign governments adopt different trade instruments between subsidy and tariff, which will be discussed in the next section. (See section 4.1) Third, both governments cannot achieve the maximum welfare in the first-best allocation even under the subsidy regime. When the government decides the direct allocation which maximizes its domestic welfare, where the market price is equal to marginal production cost, both governments can get the maximum welfare level of . It confirms that privatization neutrality theorem does not hold when foreign competitor is included in the international bilateral trade model under the different optimal subsidy/tariff regimes. 9 That is, the effect of privatization on welfare is affected by the response of the foreign country's policy in bilateral trade. Thus, strategic bilateral trade leads to a significantly different welfare comparison before and after the imposition of production subsidy. In particular, the degree of privatization under subsidy regime should be lower than that under tariff regime, which is also lower than that under dual trade instruments.
8 It is easy to show that the equilibrium in subsidy regime is not an equilibrium in the dual-instrument regime. For this, suppose that one country i sets the optimal subsidy, tariff, and privatization at the optimal levels in subsidy regime, i.e., which induces country j to deviate from the results in subsidy regime. 9 Privatization neutrality theorem states that privatization does not affect welfare regardless of time structure, competition mode, the number of firms, product differentiation, and the degree of privatization under the optimal tax-subsidy policy. This well-known theorem has been discussed in White (1996) , Poyago-Theotoky (2001), Tomaru (2006) , Hashimzade et al. (2007) and Matsumura and Okumura (2013) . However, if there are foreign competitors, privatization matters on the welfare even under the optimal tax-subsidy policy. See, for example, Matsumura and Tomaru (2012) .
Discussions
In this section, we first analyze the equilibrium with asymmetric trade instruments where domestic and foreign governments adopt different trade instruments. We next compare the equilibrium outcomes in the bilateral mixed market with the previous results under a unilateral mixed market. We then investigate the results under Stackelberg leadership of SOE and compare them with those under Cournot competition. Finally, we investigate the local optimum for maximum-revenue and global optimum for maximum-welfare under Cournot competition.
Asymmetric trade instruments between subsidy and tariff
We have considered the symmetric trade instruments case where domestic and foreign governments adopt same trade instruments between subsidy and tariff in section 3. Here we analyze the asymmetric situation where two governments adopt different trade instruments in the international bilateral mixed market, and provide the similar situation of prisoner's dilemma game.
Suppose that domestic government adopts a positive production subsidy to its domestic SOE and PE, ( 0) i s  , and foreign government adopts a positive import tariff, ( 0) j t  . Then, the profit functions of SOE and PE, and the social welfare of domestic and foreign countries are as follows:
Let superscript "A*" denote the equilibrium outcome in this asymmetric trade instruments case. The first-order conditions provide the following optimal degree of privatization, subsidy and tariff: which adopts product subsidy is lower than that of country j which adopts import tariff,
Also, optimal subsidy and tariff levels of both countries are higher than those under dual symmetric policy instruments, while optimal privatization is lower than that under symmetric dual policy instruments,
Substituting them into the equilibrium outputs yields the optimal market output and price in the two countries, 
the government which adopts an import tariff policy under asymmetric trade instruments will be better off than that under symmetry trade instrument. However, this asymmetric trade instrument will harm the other country which adopts a production subsidy only and thus, will make the other country to choose tariff, i.e., * * ( 0, 0) 0.322 0.324
It also yields the prisoner's dilemma situation: if both countries cooperate to choose the subsidy-only policy with partial privatization, then 9 both can get higher social welfares. However, the government under asymmetric trade instruments situation will rush to adopt the import tariff in order to obtain a higher social welfare which leads the equilibrium of the symmetric import tariff only with partial privatization. (See footnote 7.)
Comparison with unilateral mixed market
We examine the equilibria under production subsidy, import tariff, and dual trade instruments choices in the international unilateral mixed market, where there exists one home country in which the SOE compete with the domestic PE and one foreign PE. In particular, from the previous models, if we set 0, Han (2012) showed that the government prefers the product subsidy to the import tariff (p.589, Proposition 2), and the social welfare is higher when it simultaneously adopts dual trade instruments of subsidy and tariff than that when it only adopts a single-trade instrument whether it is subsidy or tariff (p.591, Proposition 4). Furthermore, it is shown that the optimal regime choice is that the SOE is privatized completely and the dual trade instrument of subsidy and tariff is used jointly in a unilateral mixed market. Therefore, it also confirms that privatization neutrality theorem does not hold when foreign competition is included under the different optimal subsidy/tariff regimes.
The reasoning for the above results is as follows: the role of a subsidy is expanding the total industry output while the role of a tariff is reducing the output of foreign firms. Thus, a subsidy improves the social welfare through increasing consumer surplus while a tariff improves the social welfare through gaining tariff revenue. However, unlike subsidy, the tariff lowers the total industry output and thus lowers consumer surplus. It implies that welfare-maximizing government prefers the product subsidy to the import tariff.
10 Comparing the effects of subsidy and tariff, we can find that subsidy can shift production from the high-cost SOE to the low-cost PE, and thus subsidy can induce welfare-improving output substitution effect between the SOE and domestic PE. Accordingly, the government chooses a higher subsidy and a lower tariff, coupled with complete privatization. However, in the bilateral mixed market where the PEs can export their products to the opposite country, the reduced output of the SOE through privatization will be substituted by the foreign PE and the increased exporting output of domestic PE will increase the cost of domestic PE. Thus, privatization will reduce the welfare-improving output substitution effect. It implies that both governments will choose the partial privatization in the bilateral mixed market and the effectiveness of free trade policy is significant, which is sharply contrasted to the previous results of Han (2012) in a unilateral mixed market. In particular, the strategic interaction under competitive equilibrium in the bilateral mixed market requires a less subsidy and no tariff with partial privatization.
Proposition 2: Under Cournot competition, a lower production subsidy with partial privatization is the best choice in the international bilateral mixed market while dual trade instruments of higher subsidy and higher tariff with full privatization is the best choice in a unilateral mixed market.
Stackelberg competition
Then, we investigate four different regime choices of production subsidy and import tariff under Stackelberg competition in the international bilateral mixed market where the semi-pubic firm acts as a leader.
11 Let superscript "SD*", "SN*", "SS*" and "ST*" denote the equilibrium outcomes under Stackelberg competition, respectively. We first consider the case in which both governments adopt dual trade instments with the privatization simultaneously. Under Stackelberg competition with a dominant semi-public firm, after given the announced levels of θ i , the SOE maximize O i and then the PE maximize pi  sequentially, observing the levels of privatization and the output levels of the SOE.
In the third stage, maximizing pi  for a given θ i and si q , we can obtain the output of each PE TABLE I and TABLE III , we find that the optimal degree of tariff, subsidy and social welfare under Stackelberg competition are the same with those under Cournot competition. The only difference is the optimal degree of privatization. The reasoning is as follows: the objective function of SOE is the same with that of the government when both governments retain all the ownership of SOE. Then, because the SOE can set its output in advance of the PE as a Stackelberg leader, the government can enjoy a first-mover-advantage in order to achieve the same level of social welfare with that under Cournot competition. Therefore, as long as the optimal degree of privatization is well chosen by the government, the social welfare in the international bilateral mixed market is independent of the pattern of competition. It is noteworthy that this finding is consistent with the unilateral case in Wang et al. (2009), and Lee (2011) . 
Maximum-revenue and global optimum
Finally, we investigate the local optimum for maximum-revenue and global optimum for maximum-welfare under Cournot competition.
12
We first consider the local optimum in which both governments maximize the government revenue, 
Then, we compare the maximum-revenue equilibrium with the maximum-welfare equilibrium in the following TABLE IV. The economic reasoning is that privatization decreases the output of SOE which also attracts more exports from the foreign country. Thus, the increased exports from the foreign country will directly lead to an increase in the local government revenue. This finding is still consistent with the previous result of Wang et al. (2010 Wang et al. ( , 2012 in a unilatral mixed marekt. This proposition indicates that both governments should choose higher privatization levels and subsidy rates when they maximize the global welfare even though the local country's optimal degree of tariff is the same as the global optimum, which is zero tariff rate. The intuition comes from the strategic interaction between the two independent countries. There is a business stealing effect from the foreign firms, and thus, concerning its own country's welfare, each government will strategically reduce the degree of privatization to lessen the business-stealing effect. However, from the perspective of global welfare where both governments do not take the business-stealing effect into consideration at all, a higher degree of privatization will increase the cost-saving effect from the PEs, and thus increase both the home country's welfare and the foreign country's welfare, i.e., global welfare. This competitive equilibrium can be seen as the prisoner's dilemma, which was also examined by Han and Ogawa (2008) and Lee et al. (2013) .
Conclusions
This paper considered an international bilateral mixed market where a domestic state-owned enterprise competes with both domestic and foreign private firms. We examined the strategic interaction of two countries' optimal choices of trade instruments such as production subsidy and import tariff, coupled with privatization policy.
The main results of our analysis are as follows: First, under Cournot competition, the highest social welfare can be achieved when both governments adopt a production subsidy only with partial privatization in the international bilateral mixed market. This is contrasted to the previous results under the unilateral mixed market, in which dual-trade instruments of subsidy and tariff with full nationalization is the best choice.
Second, we examined the asymmetric choices of two countries on trade instruments between subsidy and tariff, and emphasized the importance of FTA as a coordination device to solve the prisoner's dilemma at a competitive equilibrium, where both countries could achieve higher social welfare if they cooperate and adopt a subsidy instrument only under FTA.
Third, when the SOE takes a leadership position under Stackelberg competition, except for the optimal degree of privatization, the optimal values of subsidy, tariff and social welfare are the same with the results under Cournot competition. This implies that as far as the optimal degree of privatization is well chosen by the government, the social welfare in the international bilateral mixed market is independent of the pattern of competition. Thus, we showed that the optimal decision on the privatization matters on the welfare even under optimal subsidy/tariff regimes.
Fourth, the maximum-revenue privatization, combined with the zero subsidy and higher tariff, is higher than optimum-welfare privatization in the international bilateral mixed market. However, the international bilateral equilibrium yields less degree of privatization and lower subsidy rate, even though it is jointly suboptimal from the viewpoint of global welfare.
Finally, one might wonder how robust the results are under alternative scenarios for the various modes of competition such as Bertrand competition or/and product differentiation, the number of private firms, and more general specifications of demand and cost functions between the SOEs and the PEs, and so on. We expect that the importance of FTA in the bilateral mixed market is still effective on determining the optimal decisions on the privatization and subsidy rate, even though the competitive effect of other factors will increase the degree of privatization and decrease the level of subsidy. These policy issues will be challenging issue for the future study.
Appendix I
The proof of no-export equilibrium of the SOE Suppose that SOE can export output to the other country, which is denoted by 
